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Abstract
We investigate the empirical relationship between decentralisation and
corruption. Using a newly assembled dataset containing data for up to 174
countries, we revisit the empirical evidence and seek to explain some of
the inconsistent results that exist in the literature. We find that not only
results differ due to the use of different specifications and data but more
importantly because previous research overlooks the relationship between
different dimensions of decentralisation. We propose an approach aimed at
exploring the aggregate effect of decentralization on corruption. In this con-
text, we analyze the existence of direct and indirect effects of these aspects
on corruption. Our results suggest that fiscal (market) decentralisation is
associated with lower corruption. However, we also find that constitutional
decentralisation (federalism) is associated with higher corruption. Further-
more, we find that certain forms of political decentralisation worsen the
positive effect of constitutional centralization on corruption. Finally, other
forms of decentralisation such as spatial decentralisation do not appear to
have a strong association with corruption. Our results suggest the possi-
bility that previous empirical work may grossly overestimate de aggregate
impact of decentralization and corruption.
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1 Introduction
In the past 30 years the number of federal states has increased. Among indus-
trialized countries, Spain and Belgium have joined Australia, Canada, Germany,
Switzerland and the United States. Similarly, Italy agreed to a federalist turn af-
ter a Constitutional reform in 2001. Developing countries are also becoming more
federal: Brazil and Ethiopia have already embraced a federal arrangement, fed-
eralism is well under way in Uganda, Indonesia and Sri Lanka and the transition
to a federal form of government has already been started in Iraq and Sudan. Al-
though the motivations in each case respond to different factors, there are certain
common elements behind this trend. One such element is the view that centralised
governments encourage rent-seeking behaviour and therefore lead to higher lev-
els of corruption1 [Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)]. The theoretical literature
on this topic would suggest however that such a simple view of the policy choice
available is misplaced. The relationship between decentralisation and corruption
is complex: decentralisation is multifaceted and can give rise to mixed predictions.
Under some conditions centralised governments are more corrupt whereas under
some other definition of decentralisation they are more corrupt2.
Because of the reasons mentioned above, it is not surprising to observe a number
of apparent inconsistencies in the empirical literature of decentralisation and cor-
ruption3. For instance, while some papers find evidence that federal countries have
higher corruption ratings [Goldsmith (1999), Treisman (2000), and Wu (2005)],
several other scholars have found that fiscal decentralisation is associated with
lower corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002), Barenstein and de Mello (2001)]. In
theory, federal states are not necessarily fiscally decentralised states, although it
seems that there exists a positive association between these. According to Ebel
and Yilmaz (2002), the average sub-national share of expenditures is 38% for
federal countries and 22% for unitary countries. However, there are examples of
1Other important motivations for favouring a federal structure are the presence of strong
ethnic minorities and national identities; the existence of considerable regional inequalities and
the strengthening of local democratic institutions. For a more detailed insight of the causes of
decentralisation see Rondinelli (2006)
2For an excellent survey on the theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature see
Fjelstad (2004).
3Methodological issues and conceptual problems are also important and contribute to generate
inconsistencies and make comparison difficult. For an excellent discussion about these problems
see ?
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traditionally unitarist countries with a high degree of fiscal decentralisation. This
is the case of the Scandinavian nations where sub-national expenditures represent
over 30% of total government expenditures. The UK, embracing the devolved
state model, is another example with sub-national expenditures averaging 23%
during the 90’s. At the other end, certain federal countries have a low degree of
fiscal decentralisation: some notable examples are Croatia and Indonesia with only
around 10% of their total government expenditures accounted for by sub-national
governments.
Other studies focus on different aspects of decentralisation, such as political or ad-
ministrative decentralisation. Based on long-standing political science theories, it
has been argued that political decentralisation is important to improve account-
ability at the lower levels but the empirical evidence is inconclusive and often
contradictory. Among those who find that accountability is improved with the
existence of political decentralisation are Ames (1994) and Samuels (2000). Other
authors find no significant evidence of such relationship [Gelineau and Remmer
(2006)]. Additionally, some papers have found evidence that administrative de-
centralisation4 within the public sector is associated with lower corruption [Wade
(1997), Kuncoro (2004)].
In this paper we try to bring the empirics closer to the theory by acknowledging
the several different dimensions of decentralisation and by taking a closer look at
the empirical relationships among them. In so doing we build on a small recent
literature that recognises this point. Treisman (2002b,a) provides a systematic
treatment of the issue, carefully defining different types of decentralisation and
providing measures for each of them. Recognising the importance of their joint
effect on corruption he finds some direct effects but no interaction or indirect
effects. Our study has a closer relationship with Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya
(2007) however who test whether the effects of one of the aspects of decentralisation
we also consider, fiscal decentralisation, on corruption depend on the existence and
type of political institutions. In particular, they analyse how the level of political
centralisation modifies the effect of fiscal decentralisation on corruption. They
find evidence from this approach that strong party systems improve the result of
fiscal decentralisation on corruption and that political centralisation along with
4On the field of administrative decentralisation, ?ścohen96 provide conceptual elements, high-
light links with other dimnesions and identify strategies of administrative decentralisation.
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market decentralisation improves government quality for a sample of developing
countries. This evidence offers support for some long-standing political theories
of decentralisation.
Our work raises the following issues:
• Based on theoretical explanations, which decentralisation measures are im-
portant?
• Are there multi-dimensional aspects?
• Are there any significant interaction effects?
• What is the aggregate effect of decentralisation on bureaucratic corruption?
We contribute to this recent literature both by recognising and measuring the
existence of different dimensions of decentralisation but we also examine some
hypotheses in order to provide a sensible econometric model. We collect a large
set of decentralisation indicators -many of which have been used alternatively by
earlier research- and group them into categories in order to re-examine the rel-
evant empirical literature in a different light. Interestingly, we find evidence of
heterogeneity in the relationship between decentralisation and corruption regard-
less of the decentralisation measure used. Furthermore, unlike earlier research we
argue and find that some types of decentralisation are simultaneously associated
with corruption through both direct and indirect effects. We do not explore the
co-evolution of these dimensions of decentralisation5.
Our finding that long-standing unitary countries (constitutional centralisation)
which are also fiscally decentralised have low corruption is to some extent present
in earlier research. But unlike previous work, we find these two dimensions of
decentralisation significantly associated with corruption simultaneously. This re-
sult is quite robust both in terms of a variety of specifications and controls used
and in terms of alternative decentralisation measures. Furthermore, we also find
5Unfortunately, we were not able to analyse time-varying features of the relationship between
corruption and decentralisation. Although we have data on corruption and other control variables
since 1975, there are almost no time-series data for decentralisation indicators. Apart from
annual dummies of no use in panel-data methods, the only decentralisation measures with time-
series data are exp and rev. The problem with these is that the sample of countries suffers
significant variations throughout the 25-year period.
4
evidence suggesting that political decentralisation -in particular, the existence of
municipal elections- is also associated to corruption but only indirectly through its
effect on constitutional decentralisation. In particular, political decentralisation
worsens the impact of constitutional centralisation on corruption. This result is
similar to Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) who find a negative indirect effect
of political institutions on corruption.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review
the theoretical background of decentralisation and federalism, define the different
dimensions and explore the interrelations and overlaps between these dimensions.
Section 3 details the data and the empirical strategy followed. Section 4 presents
and discusses the main results. We also analyse different hypotheses regarding the
joint impact of different dimensions of decentralisation on corruption. Section 5
concludes.
2 Decentralisation and theory
To motivate the empirical analysis we provide a review of the literature on decen-
tralisation and corruption. Using a well-known approach6, we define four different
types of decentralisation.
Market Decentralisation7. Usually associated with the traditional theory of
fiscal federalism rooted in the public finance literature8, this form of decentrali-
sation is concerned with the study of the conditions required for the existence of
market mechanisms for the production and provision of goods and services. Based
on ideas developed during the 50’s, Oates (1972) shows first that in a multi-level
government situation where at least some public goods have regionally-bounded
benefits, decentralised finance provides opportunities for gains in social welfare.
Even in the presence of inter-jurisdictional externalities, decentralised provision
creates a better outcome as opposed to a uniform centralised provision of public
6The categorisation follows loosely the Type-Function Framework. This is the currently
dominant approach to define and divide the different forms and types of decentralisation and is
largely based on the work of Cheema, Nellis and Rondinelli. An overview of the Type-Function
Framework given in ?
7In this paper, we use the terms market decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation indistinc-
tively
8See Oates (2005) for references and summary of major contributions to this literature
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goods. Second, there is an informational asymmetry: local governments are bet-
ter informed about the local preferences than the central government; this is also
known as the preference-matching argument for fiscal decentralisation. Third,
there is Tiebout’s ’voting-with-the-feet’ idea that citizens will sort themselves
into homogeneous communities demanding the same local public goods [Tiebout
(1956)]. Finally, the existence and enforcement of hard-budget constraints should
encourage local and regional governments to find ways to generate and rely on their
own sources of revenue. On the contrary, if the local and regional governments
customarily receive transfers from the centre or there are soft budget constraints,
it is likely that efficiency levels will drop. Taking these arguments together, we
would expect the scope for bureaucratic corruption to be lower in the presence
of market decentralisation. In principle, intergovernmental competition to attract
residents lowers the incentive and ability to extract rents and bribes. Moreover,
the existence of hard-budget constraints reduces the scope for corruption since
local governments are entirely responsible for financing their own expenditures.
In spite of the previous considerations, there remain theoretical arguments that
suggest that forms of market decentralisation, such as fiscal decentralisation, may
create perverse incentives and stimulate corrupt behaviour. For example, because
of over-budgeting and lack of accountability in the case of soft-budget constraints
arising from tax evasion and unconditional intergovernmental grants. This situa-
tion may be particularly relevant in cases where there is no political decentralisa-
tion. Another possible factor that may distort incentives is the way sub-national
budgets are financed. Barenstein and de Mello (2001) have suggested that the re-
lationship of fiscal decentralisation to corruption hinged on the way sub-national
expenditures are financed.
Political Decentralisation. There is perhaps no better description of the dif-
ficulties in defining centralisation than Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that
“Centralisation is now a word constantly repeated but is one that, generally speak-
ing, no one tries to define accurately”9. Alongside Montesquieu and philosophers
from the Enlightenment, de Tocqueville’s ideas on federalism and decentralisation
generated vigorous research effort to study the advantages and disadvantages of
political decentralisation. The central idea of political decentralisation (or gov-
9Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, Part 1, ch. 5.
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ernment decentralisation as is also called) is that citizens should be given more
power in political and public decision-making. This involves the creation of a
number of different institutions that support this objective. Local and regional
elections, regional autonomy, local committees and civil associations, sub-national
authority over taxation, spending and legislation, are all different mechanisms in-
volved in the context of political decentralisation. There are several arguments
favouring political decentralisation. The most commonly cited are the greater ac-
countability to the local and regional electorate, the development of a civic local
culture by fostering democratisation and the involvement of other local actors in
the decision-making process (NGO’s, civil and professional associations, private
sector, etc.).
Despite these theoretical arguments endorsing political decentralisation, others
have highlighted the potential dangers associated to political decentralisation.
One of the most notable contributions is the work of Riker (1964), who pro-
vided strong theoretical arguments in favour of political centralisation. The basic
idea is that political centralisation may serve as a mechanism to complement and
boost the outcome of fiscal decentralisation by making local politicians internalise
inter-jurisdictional externalities to a greater extent. Alternatively Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2000) argue that political decentralisation may not be as effective if
local capture of public officials by interest groups is widespread.
Constitutional Decentralisation10. The concept of constitutional decentrali-
sation (or equivalently constitutional federalism) is closely associated with what is
known as de iure federalism, representing the establishment of a federal regime by
the Constitution. There is however, in addition the concept of contingent decen-
tralisation, which refers to our current understanding of federalism as including
the erosion and degradation of the constitutional decentralisation principle by
jurisprudence and/or Courts rulings [Aranson (1990)]. In words of this author,
“Federalism as constitutional decentralisation differs from federalism as contingent
decentralisation in that the authority of the states under constitutional decentrali-
sation is guaranteed as a matter of organic, constitutional law. Neither prudential
nor political judgments or decisions taken at the national level can overturn such
10We refer to constitutional decentralisation as the Constitution’s federalism, the legal doc-
trine. This expression was originally introduced by Diamond (1969) in his article about the
relationship between federalism and decentralisation.
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guarantees in the face of the appropriate legal fidelity to the original constitu-
tional arrangement” [Aranson (1990), p. 20]. One connotation derived from this
distinction is that constitutional decentralisation is a rather static concept while
contingent decentralisation is inherently dynamic. In general, constitutional and
contingent decentralisation will differ: contingent decentralisation is driven by
pure utilitarist motives and this will shape the distribution of powers and federal
arrangements in practice. Aranson (1990) shows the widening gap between these
two concepts but in general it has happened in several other federal countries.
It may be even argued that contingent decentralisation will eventually cause a
country to re-centralize if many judicial or consuetudinary instances erode the
true nature and spirit of constitutional decentralisation. At the empirical level,
however, distinguishing between these two types of ’federalism’ is not practicable
and only constitutional decentralisation measures can be used.
What are the predictions of the theory for the relationship between constitutional
decentralisation and corruption? Similarly to the case of political decentralisation
the answer is not clear. Constitutional federalism has often been advocated as a
system to accommodate ethnic and religious differences and other regional diver-
gences [Bermeo (2002)]. Federalism provides room for diversity and reduces the
possibility of tensions and conflicts which may also originate opportunities for the
extraction of rents. Yet on the other hand, the well-known arguments of multi-
plication and overlapping of layers of government causing accountability problems
and the ’overgrazing’ of the bribe base in federal systems suggests that the latter
may also be associated to higher corruption.
Spatial Decentralisation. This form of decentralisation refers to the actions
and strategies aimed at encouraging the development of regional growth poles
outside major urban areas. If succesful, this has obvious implications for the
distribution of the size of cities. In political economy, it is usually associated
with a narrower concept and known as structural or vertical decentralisation. For
example Treisman (2002b) suggests that structural decentralisation refers to the
number of tiers of government. Essentially, the greater the number of tiers the
more decentralised a country is. This definition gives only a partial and crude
account of this type of decentralisation as it only considers the number of levels
of government and not the number, size and density of cities.
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Spatial decentralisation is likely to be related to other forms of decentralisation,
most evidently with constitutional decentralisation. In fact, it is possible that
with several tiers of government, only some may have the constitutional authority
over certain decisions (i.e. spending, taxing, legislation, etc.) or be responsible for
their own sources of revenues and expenditures. The definition given by Treisman
defines a tier as having a political executive in charge of certain decisions over a
territorial jurisdiction. It is also clear from this that spatial and political decen-
tralisation may be closely linked. Other measures, including the number of cities
at the intermediate and local level, may be also considered as representing aspects
of spatial decentralisation.
3 Data and sample characteristics
The empirical approach adopted in the paper builds the relationship between
decentralisation in stages. In the first stage we try to identify which measures of
the different aspects of decentralisation are correlated with corruption. As a second
stage we then consider the multi-faceted nature of decentralisation, and attempt
to establish the robustness of the results in the first stage to other aspects of
decentralisation. Finally, we allow for the possibility that there may be interesting
interactions between the various measures of decentralisation.
In this section we describe and motivate the choice of regression model that we use
in the first stage of the empirical analysis and summarise the main characteristics
of the data. The baseline model we adopt in the paper is given by a standard
corruption equation. It regresses a measure of corruption against a series of control
variables usually included in any corruption regression [Treisman (2000); Serra
(2006)] and a series of decentralisation measures:
CORRi = β0 + β1DECi + β2 logGDPi + β3 logPOPULi + β4PRESSi + εi (1)
where CORRi is the corruption index of choice, DECi is our decentralisation
indicator, logGDPi is the logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP), logPOPULi is the
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logarithm of total population and PRESSi is the degree of press freedom11.
We test Model 1 using a dataset containing information for up to 177 countries.
This data include standard decentralisation indicators used by others and some
newly assembled measures. To measure corruption we use the World Bank’s Con-
trol of Corruption Index12. The decentralisation measures, definitions and cover-
age are given in Table 1 below. Some of the indicators are alternative measures
for a certain type of decentralisation. More details about the data source and
methodological procedure are given in the Data Appendix. Table 2 presents sum-
mary statistics for some of our variables.
Table 1: Decentralisation indicators
Variable Description Type Obs Years
exp Sub-national expenditure (% total exp.) Market 69 1990-00**
rev Sub-national revenue (% total revenue) Market 68 1990-00**
fis Score for fiscal decentralisation Market 67 1996
muni Local governments elected? Political 127 2000
state State/province governments elected? Political 134 2000
stconst Are senators’ constituencies the provinces? Political 58 2000
author Sub-national authority in fiscal and legal Political 61 2000
auton Existence of autonomous regions Political 156 2000
pol Score for political decentralisation Political 67 1996
dec2 Political decentralisation index (1) Political 75 2000
dec4 Political decentralisation index (2) Political 80 2000
federal Federalism dummy Constitutional 177 2000
federal(2) Federalism dummy (broad concept) Constitutional 177 2000
fedindex Index of federalism Constitutional 125 2000
unitary Index of unitarism Constitutional 106 2000
unitaryhis Index of unitary history Constitutional 106 2000
tiers Number of elected sub-national tiers Spatial 127 1999
regj Number of intermediate jurisdictions Spatial 61 1999
locj Number of local jurisdictions Spatial 108 1999
* This is the number of countries with data available for each indicator (using the WBC corruption index).
** Average for the period. For sources see Data Appendix
In line with our discussion in the previous section, we group these measures into
four groups: market, constitutional, political and spatial decentralisation. In many
11This is essentially a proxy for democratic conditions in a country. The inclusion of this
variable here is supported by the empirical evidence confirming its robustness as a determinant
of corruption [Brunetti and Weder (2003), Chowdhury (2004), and Freille et al. (ming)] and the
high correlation between press freedom and all the democracy indicators.
12This choice is made to maximise the set of available observations. We have tested the ro-
bustness of this choice to the alternative measures of corruption by Transparency International’s
CPI and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and for a common set of countries find
no substantive differences. These results are available from the authors on request.
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cases we can capture different aspects of these four main types of decentralisation.
We detail the data sources for these variables in the Appendix, along with some
summary statistics and the correlation between the variables.
Fiscal Decentralisation. The most commonly used indicator of fiscal decen-
tralisation in the literature is the percentage ratio of sub-national government
expenditure to total government expenditure. We also consider the sub-national
government revenue since it is also a reasonable measure13. In both cases the data
are an average for the 1990-2000 period.
Constitutional Decentralisation. Constitutional decentralisation refers to whether
the structure of the relations between different government units are based on fed-
eral or unitary grounds according to legal bodies. In general, researchers capture
this as a zero-one dummy with all countries not explicitly federal being considered
as unitarian. In our study we explore several alternatives to this. Our main control
for the federal structure of a country -unitaryhis-, however, is a newly assembled
indicator that measures not only the current status of federal or unitary but also
takes into account history into consideration. In particular, this variable gives the
score of unitary history for a country during a period of 100 years. In other words,
if a country has always been a federation or federal (Argentina, Canada, Malaysia
and Switzerland among others), then the score assigned is 0. Countries that have
been mostly unitary throughout this time period (like Denmark, Japan, and Swe-
den), receive high scores, whereas countries that have changed either changed
regime or have a relatively short unitary history are ranked in between (Austria,
Spain and Thailand).
Political Decentralisation. According to the World Bank, political decentrali-
sation is about providing the citizens of a country more power in public decision-
making and is associated with institutions ranging from pluralistic politics and
representative government, to local and regional democratization and greater par-
ticipation in decisions. We have a number of political decentralisation indicators
taken from different sources. We consider three of these to most fully capture
13One problem of using these two indicators as alternative is the existence of vertical fiscal im-
balances. In short, this implies that sub-national revenues fall short of sub-national expenditure
and the difference should be compensated by coordination mechanisms between the different lev-
els of government. If the vertical imbalance is relatively high, it is better to use the expenditure
indicator since it captures more adequately the degree of public service decentralisation.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for selected variables
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
exp Share of sub-national gov. exp. 22.9 15.6 2.02 80.53 69
rev Share of sub-national gov. revenue 18.03 14.8 0.81 78.12 68
author Sub-national authority in spend/tax 0.44 0.5 0 1 61
federal_alt Dummy for federalism [Treisman] 0.1 0.3 0 1 177
tiers Number of elected sub-national tiers 1.16 0.89 0 3 127
regj Number of intermediate jurisdictions 26.74 24.9 2 135 61
locj Number of local jurisdictions 4438.56 23949.3 17 237687 108
muni Local governments elected? 1.36 0.82 0 2 127
state State/prov. governments elected? 0.87 0.81 0 2 134
fis Score for fiscal decentralisation 0.41 0.22 0 1 67
pol Score for political decentralisation 0.55 0.23 0 1 67
adm Score for adm. decentralisation 0.54 0.28 0.01 1 67
auton Existence of autonomous regions? 0.1 0.3 0 1 156
stconst Are senators’ constituencies the
provinces?
0.5 0.5 0 1 58
dec2 Political decentralisation index 1 2.21 1.6 0 5 75
dec4 Political decentralisation index 2 2.2 1.53 0 4 80
federal Dummy for federal countries 0.13 0.34 0 1 177
fedindex Index of federalism 4.14 1.32 1 5 125
unitary Index of unitarism 1.6 0.74 0 2 106
unitaryhis Index of unitary history 36.82 31 0 101 106
federal(2) Federal dummy (broad) 0.28 0.45 0 1 174
cpi Corruption Perception Index (TI) 4.73 2.4 1.2 10 91
icrg Corruption Index (ICRG) 2.96 1.22 1 6 140
wbc Corruption Index (World Bank) -0.02 1.03 -1.8 2.5 173
loggdp Log of GDP per capita 3.68 0.51 2.67 4.77 160
logpopul Log of total population 6.86 0.76 5.01 9.1 174
pss Press freedom index 48.17 25.04 5 100 174
democindex Index of democracy 5.93 7.99 0 66 153
demochis Dummy for democratic history 0.26 0.44 0 1 107
polrights Index of political rights 3.59 2.23 1 7 174
democ1 Alternative democracy index 3.65 1.98 1 7 174
bri Dummy for former British colony 0.28 0.45 0 1 177
fre Dummy for former French colony 0.16 0.37 0 1 177
spa Dummy for former Spanish colony 0.11 0.32 0 1 177
por Dummy for former Port. colony 0.03 0.17 0 1 177
ethno Ethno-linguistic frac. index 0.35 0.3 0 1 143
eng English legal system (dummy) 0.31 0.46 0 1 175
soc Socialist legal system (dummy) 0.19 0.4 0 1 175
fre French legal system (dummy) 0.43 0.5 0 1 175
ger German legal system (dummy) 0.03 0.18 0 1 175
sca Scandinavian legal system (dummy) 0.03 0.17 0 1 175
pro_d Dummy for Protestant country 0.22 0.41 0 1 174
Note: Only selected variables are given in the Table. Data for year 2000, otherwise the closest available
year. For sources and data description see table 11 in Appendix ??
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the essence of political decentralisation: muni, a categorical variable indicating
the existence of municipal executive and legislative elections, state, a similar vari-
able for provincial or state elections and stconst, a dummy registering whether
the provinces/states represent the constituencies of the senators. Although we
consider all three indicators in our regressions, we believe the variables measur-
ing the existence of municipal elections, muni, best captures the idea of political
decentralisation.
Spatial Decentralisation. Finally, spatial decentralisation concerns the vertical
(number of tiers) and horizontal (number of jurisdictions within each tier) make-
up of the political structure14. We use three indicators: the number of elected
tiers (tiers), the number of elected regions or jurisdictions within the upper tier
(regj ) and the number of elected localities or jurisdictions within the lower tier
(locj ).
Table 8 in the Appendix shows the correlations between different forms of de-
centralisation, while we reproduce the correlation from the main decentralisation
variables in Table 3. It appears from both that the interrelations between con-
stitutional, political and structural decentralisation are straightforward. Of the
correlations that are found some are intuitive; the positive correlation between
federal and unitaryhis ; that countries with a federal system are also likely to have
local (muni) and regional (state) elections and have higher number of elected gov-
ernment tiers (tiers), for example. Other significant correlations are harder to
explain as is the case with the correlation between unitaryhis and stconst.
Figure 1 provides a different way to look at the data. Here we arrange countries
according to their fiscal and constitutional decentralisation regimes and indicate
the level of corruption in those countries. According to the previous literature,
we would expect countries with a high level of market decentralisation and with
constitutional centralisation (unitarism) to show low corruption levels. This is
observerd in the figure by looking at the upper right-hand side quadrant where all
countries (in bold) have low corruption levels. Similarly, countries with low levels
of market decentralisation and with constitutional decentralisation (federalism)
should have high corruption levels. Although the evidence is not as strong as
14Treisman (2002b) introduces his definition of vertical decentralisation by measuring the
number of tiers in a system. This categorization includes single-tiered systems such as Singapore
and multi-tiered systems such as Argentina, the United States and China.
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Table 3: Pairwise correlations between selected decentralisation indica-
tors
Variables unitaryhis muni locj federal state stconst tiers regj
unitaryhis 1.000
(106)
muni 0.137 1.000
(85) (127)
locj -0.141 0.108 1.000
(78) (90) (216)
federal -0.330* 0.209* 0.275* 1.000
(106) (127) (216) (177)
state 0.045 0.547* 0.066 0.361* 1.000
(84) (110) (96) (134) (134)
stconst -0.318* 0.314* 0.201 0.447* 0.288* 1.000
(48) (45) (41) (58) (49) (58)
tiers 0.140 0.479* 0.190* 0.437* 0.359* 0.463* 1.000
(81) (104) (108) (127) (107) (42) (127)
regj 0.085 0.112 -0.003 -0.138 0.004 -0.150 0.005 1.000
(47) (55) (60) (61) (53) (31) (61) (61)
Notes: The number of observations is given under the corresponding correlation. * Denotes significance
at the 10% level
in the previous case, the lower left-hand side quadrant shows most countries as
having intermediate to high corruption levels.
4 Fiscal decentralisation, federalism and political
institutions
4.1 Which aspects of decentralization matter?
Tables 4 and 5 contain the results for the baseline regression specified above. We
have considered the robustness of the results to alternative measures of corruption
(the CPI and ICRG indices of corruption) and to changes in the number of ob-
servations. We also reproduce the latter in Table 9 in the Appendix ?? where we
use a common subset of countries including all the countries with data available
for all three corruption indexes.
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Figure 1: Fiscal and constitutional decentralisation
In discussing the results we begin with the market decentralisation indicators, the
sub-national government expenditure as a percentage of total government expen-
diture and sub-national government revenue as a percentage of total government
revenue. The results for these variables are consistent with earlier research: fis-
cal decentralisation is associated with lower corruption ratings [Huther and Shah
(1998); Fisman and Gatti (2002); Barenstein and de Mello (2001)]. The coeffi-
cients are also similar in size to those obtained previously.
In contrast to the results for market decentralisation less agreement has been found
in the literature for constitutional decentralisation. Treisman (2000) found that
federal states are perceived to be more corrupt and that this conclusion was robust
to several tests, whereas for a different indicator Gerring et al. (2005) find that
unitary systems are strongly associated to good governance. Other have found
no relationship between federalism and corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002); Wu
(2005)].
Table 5 confirms these mixed results. The zero-one federal dummy suggests that
federalism has no relationship with corruption, a result similar to that obtained if
15
we use the federal dummy included in Treisman (2000)15. Investigating the results
further, we find that we are unable to replicate Treisman’s result that federal states
are more corrupt for two reasons. Firstly, the effect of the federalism dummy is
sensitive to the inclusion of the logarithm of total population and to cultural and
historical indicators. Second, the results for the federalism dummy are sensitive
to the year of choice. Specifying the model and the data as closely as possible to
Treisman, our results are similar to his paper for 1996 and 1998 (federal states are
more corrupt) although the coefficients are never significant, but the coefficients
become negative when we use either 2000 or 2002 (federal states are less corrupt).
Also in Table 4 we explore whether using more detailed measures of constitutional
decentralisation help to improve the robustness of this variable. The first mea-
sure is an index of federalism (fedindex) ranging from 1 (most federal) to 5 (most
unitary). Although the positive sign of the coefficient implies that unitary coun-
tries are associated to lower corruption levels, it is not significantly different from
zero. The second measure is taken from Gerring et al. (2005). The authors study
the relative merits of federal and unitary systems and come to the conclusion that
long-standing unitary systems are associated with lower corruption. The unitarism
index (unitary) takes values of 0=federal (elective regional legislatures plus con-
stitutional recognition of sub-national authority), 1=semi-federal (where there are
elective legislatures at the regional level enjoying important policymaking power
but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government),
and 2=unitary [Gerring et al. (2005)]. As it can be observed from Table 5, the
coefficient on this variable is again not significant.
Our final indicator, also from Gerring et al. (2005), is an index of unitary history
(unitaryhis) created on the basis of the annual unitary scores used to construct the
dummy unitary16. The estimation results (regression corresponding to unitaryhis
in Table 4) show that countries with long standing unitary regimes perform better
15Our federal dummy includes a slightly larger number of countries and therefore the number
of federal states differ between our study and Treisman’s. He uses the classification of federal
countries as given in Elazar (1995), while we use this and other sources to update the data. As
a result of this, we add Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Ethiopia, Serbia and Montenegro,
South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates to the list of federal countries.
16Although the authors have used time series data we estimate the model using the index
for the year 2000. We do this since there is little year-to-year variation in the index and we
were unable to obtain the original data. The variable measures the unitary history of a country
from 1901 to 2000. For construction, measurement and coverage of this index see Gerring et al.
(2005).
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in terms of corruption. Using our simple baseline regression, we have obtained the
same qualitative results as Gerring et al. (2005), although it should be noted that
they use the ICRG index of corruption instead. For the same index of corruption
we find an insignificant effect from the unitary history variable (it is significant if
we use the CPI index of corruption)17.
In other models in Tables 4 and 5, we explore the relationship between political
dimensions of decentralisation and corruption. Several forms of political decen-
tralisation have been recognized in the literature including electoral decentralisa-
tion, structure of the party system, decision-making authority and residual powers
[Treisman (2002b,a); Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007)]. We focus, however, on
a subset of these aspects for which we can find reliable data, namely indicators
of electoral and authority decentralisation (also known as decision-making decen-
tralisation).
It can be seen from Table 4 that none of the indicators of political decentralisation
are significantly and consistently correlated to perceived corruption. Table 5 in
Appendix suggests that this results is not robust for all measures of corruption
however. According to the regression, the variable author the greater the authority
over spending, taxing and legislation that is granted to sub-national governments,
the more likely corrupt behaviour will arise when we measure corruption using
the ICRG index. While the existence of municipal/local elections at executive
and legislative level -muni - is negatively associated with the CPI measure of cor-
ruption, along with an aggregate indicator of political decentralisation, dec4, which
aggregates over muni and state. The sensitivity of the political decentralisation
measures as determinants of corruption matches results found elsewhere in the
literature [Treisman (2002b,a)]. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) find no di-
rect relation of these indicators to corruption (only through their interaction with
fiscal decentralisation measures)18.
Finally in Table 4 we direct our attention to the spatial decentralisation indicators.
The existence of autonomous contiguous regions, the number of regional jurisdic-
tions and the number of local jurisdictions are included here along with the number
17Some investigation suggests that this difference is due to the use of panel data in their study.
18The severe limitations of the data, in its majority dummies or categorical variables suggest
a careful interpretation of these findings. In any case, the available indicators do not seem to be
affecting or affected by corruption in a direct way.
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of elected sub-national tiers (vertical decentralisation according to Treisman). In
no case is there any evidence of a relationship of any kind with corruption. This
is consistent with Treisman (2002a) who found that the number of sub-national
elected tiers is sensitive to the inclusion of a measure of GDP, one of the most
robust determinants of corruption, and country size. The existence of autonomous
contiguous regions may be in principle associated to lower corruption given that
these regions may be seen as checks on the central authority. But the fact that
most of these regions are associated to ethnic groups would probably act as a bal-
ancing act increasing corruption derived from ethnic or linguistic fragmentation.
The data suggest that auton and corruption are not directly related.
From our discussion above, it is clear that there are relatively few measures of
decentralisation that directly impact on corruption and even fewer that are robust
across the different indices of corruption typically used in the literature. Some
combinations of the significant variables uncovered are also somewhat puzzling.
For example, how is that federal countries are more corrupt than unitary countries
if market decentralisation is associated with lower corruption? Is the relationship
between market decentralisation and corruption the same at different levels of
market and political decentralisation? Why is political decentralisation not re-
lated to corruption in light of all the electoral accountability and local capture
theories? To what extent is spatial decentralisation associated to more efficient
organisation and delivery of public services? Does granting decision-making au-
thority to sub-national governments have different impact on corruption if electoral
decentralisation is in place?
4.2 Multi-dimensional corruption
One of our objectives in this work is to try to analyse a number of dimensions
of decentralisation and their relationship with corruption. As we noticed earlier,
the literature in this area is somewhat vague in describing the way in which dif-
ferent aspects of decentralisation may be simultaneously important. In Table 6
we concentrate on the main variables found to be significant in Table 4. Model 1
replicates the very basic model included in Table 4 with only the market decen-
tralisation indicator (rev) controlled for. In model 5 we include both the market
decentralisation and unitary history measures, in model 7 we add the political
20
decentralisation measure muni and in model 8 we add the spatial decentralisation
control, locj. Only the results for market and constitutional decentralisation are
robust; indeed their estimated effects increase in size and significance compared to
the earlier regressions. These results do not change when we include the spatial
and political decentralisation measures, excluding the market and constitutional
decentralisation measures. This regression also highlights a limitation of trying to
control for many dimensions of decentralisation, since the number of observations
drops markedly. The main drop in the number of observations from model 5 to 12
is caused by the inclusion of muni for which we have many missing observations.
We have also tested (although they are not shown in the table) the other indicators
for constitutional (federal), political (state, stconst) and spatial (tiers, regj ) de-
centralisation in the regressions as alternative indicators of unitaryhis, muni and
locj. In no case are the coefficients significantly different from zero.
As a final check on these models, we have included additional controls in the speci-
fication. The idea behind this is to account for the possibility that there are direct
and independent significant effects on corruption of variables not related to decen-
tralisation. In general, when papers examine the relationship between federalism
and corruption, they either exclude any other aspect of market decentralisation
from the specification [Treisman (2000)] or they fail to find any significant direct
effect of federalism on corruption [Fisman and Gatti (2002)]. Models 9 through
12 experiment using the specification given by model 7 (market, political and con-
stitutional decentralisation altogether) and adding other standard controls that
have been suggested as robust determinants of corruption elsewhere [Treisman
(2000), La Porta et al. (1999) and Serra (2006)]. The extent of political rights, the
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, and dummies for British colonial history
and protestantism as dominant religion come out insignificant without introducing
any significant changes to the coefficients of our main variables of interest19.
19We have also used alternative indicators for each of these controls and have also controlled
for other potential determinants of corruption with the results being largely unchanged. Some
of the results are included in the Appendix and all of them may be obtained from the authors.
21
Ta
bl
e
6:
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
on
d
ec
en
tr
al
is
at
io
n
an
d
st
an
d
ar
d
co
nt
ro
ls
.
D
ir
ec
t
E
ff
ec
ts
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
r
ia
bl
e:
C
o
r
ru
pt
io
n
(W
B
C
in
d
ex
).
M
et
h
o
d
:
O
L
S
M
od
el
1
M
od
el
2
M
od
el
3
M
od
el
4
M
od
el
5
M
od
el
6
M
od
el
7
M
od
el
8
M
od
el
9
M
od
el
10
M
od
el
11
M
od
el
12
re
v
0.
01
8*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
01
7*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
9*
**
(4
.1
95
)
(7
.7
95
)
(3
.6
03
)
(7
.3
37
)
(4
.9
08
)
(7
.0
25
)
(5
.9
98
)
(7
.0
06
)
(6
.1
35
)
lo
g
g
d
p
1.
95
4*
**
1.
16
9*
**
1.
32
9*
**
1.
35
4*
**
1.
88
3*
**
2.
15
4*
**
1.
98
3*
**
2.
07
9*
**
1.
98
3*
**
2.
02
2*
**
1.
96
7*
**
1.
96
6*
**
(1
2.
65
2)
(7
.1
57
)
(6
.7
36
)
(1
0.
82
8)
(1
1.
07
3)
(1
2.
06
4)
(1
1.
46
8)
(1
0.
86
0)
(1
0.
94
7)
(9
.2
74
)
(1
1.
99
0)
(1
0.
91
7)
lo
g
p
op
u
l
-0
.1
59
**
0.
04
9
0.
09
5
-0
.0
74
-0
.1
21
-0
.1
27
-0
.1
03
-0
.1
36
-0
.1
03
-0
.1
21
-0
.1
01
-0
.0
95
(-
2.
02
2)
(0
.7
41
)
(1
.1
78
)
(-
0.
70
7)
(-
1.
54
1)
(-
1.
30
5)
(-
1.
15
7)
(-
1.
09
8)
(-
1.
14
5)
(-
1.
16
1)
(-
1.
20
6)
(-
1.
08
4)
p
ss
-0
.0
10
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
13
**
*
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
10
**
*
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
03
(-
3.
40
9)
(-
4.
47
5)
(-
3.
80
6)
(-
4.
73
7)
(-
0.
95
5)
(-
2.
73
3)
(-
0.
54
5)
(-
1.
07
9)
(-
0.
25
5)
(-
0.
95
6)
(-
1.
04
7)
(-
0.
60
8)
u
n
it
a
ry
h
is
0.
00
5*
*
0.
00
9*
**
0.
00
9*
**
0.
00
8*
**
0.
00
9*
**
0.
00
8*
**
0.
00
9*
**
0.
00
9*
**
(2
.1
10
)
(5
.3
10
)
(4
.7
27
)
(4
.0
33
)
(4
.6
63
)
(3
.6
16
)
(4
.6
57
)
(4
.1
83
)
m
u
n
i
-0
.1
58
**
-0
.1
91
-0
.1
09
-0
.0
79
-0
.1
09
-0
.1
82
-0
.1
33
-0
.1
06
(-
2.
02
2)
(-
1.
41
6)
(-
0.
68
1)
(-
0.
45
5)
(-
0.
66
6)
(-
1.
00
3)
(-
0.
85
2)
(-
0.
64
5)
lo
cj
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
(1
.1
20
)
(1
.5
32
)
p
ol
ri
g
h
ts
-0
.0
02
(-
0.
02
2)
et
h
n
o
0.
03
8
(0
.1
47
)
br
i
0.
21
8
(1
.5
79
)
p
ro
d
0.
07
2
(0
.4
36
)
A
dj
R
2
0.
85
4
0.
72
5
0.
68
4
0.
75
4
0.
90
1
0.
84
8
0.
89
0
0.
88
9
0.
88
7
0.
89
0
0.
89
4
0.
88
7
N
65
10
1
12
0
10
4
53
55
47
41
47
39
47
47
N
ot
e:
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ex
cl
ud
e
A
rg
en
ti
na
an
d
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
ti
on
.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
(o
nl
y
t-
ra
ti
os
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
).
*
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l
**
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l*
**
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
by
O
L
S.
Fo
r
de
ta
ils
on
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s
an
d
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n
se
e
ap
pe
nd
ix
??
.
22
4.3 Interaction effects
Before we move on to consider the models with indirect and interaction effects we
think it may be useful to examine the relationship between corruption and a few
of the decentralisation indicators at different degrees of decentralisation. First,
we split the sample according to certain criterion and perform a rolling regres-
sion. This procedure takes several steps involving ranking the observations on the
variable of interest (market, political constitutional or spatial decentralisation in
our case) and then running an initial regression for the observations satisfying the
chosen criterion. For example, we may choose as our initial sub-sample the ob-
servations for which market decentralisation is less than the mean value. Another
alternative is to choose an arbitrary sub-sample size and define that as the initial
sub-sample. We then run a regression using this sub-sample, obtain the estimates
and statistics and record the values. Next we add the nearest highest-ranked ob-
servation not included in the initial sub-sample and we drop the lowest-ranked
observation included in the initial sub-sample. We always keep the sub-sample
size constant throughout this analysis, thus making sure any changes are not due
to the increase/decrease in sample size. We continue this procedure until the last
(highest-ranked) observation is added and we record the estimates.
The only limitation to this procedure is that we can only perform it for the con-
tinuous measures of decentralisation, since using a discrete or categorical measure
will result in all countries having the same rank within each category. There-
fore we perform this analysis for three continuous measures of decentralisation:
exp, rev, and unitaryhis. In the exp and rev cases we are left with 68 and 67
observations respectively and we choose a sub-sample size of 30 for each20. We
use the World Bank Control of Corruption index which has been chosen as our
main corruption index. We summarize the results of the analysis in the following
graphs21. Graph 2 shows the sensitivity of the coefficient on market decentralisa-
tion as measured through sub-national expenditure (exp) to gradual shifts from
lower to higher market decentralisation. It is clear from the graph that when our
sub-sample includes the lower end of the scale (fiscally centralised countries) the
20Using the criterion of defining the sub-sample by the observations that fall below or above
the average the size of the sub-samples is 24 in the exp case and 18 in the rev case.
21The same analysis has been performed for the selected decentralisation measures using al-
ternative corruption indexes. Also, the coefficients, significance levels and all graphs may be
obtained from the authors upon request.
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coefficient of market decentralisation on corruption is negative (the dots in the
figure) although almost never significant at the 10% level. But as we gradually
include more fiscally decentralised countries in our sub-sample, the coefficients
become positive and significant for a high percentage of regressions. The fact that
the graph depicts a smooth transition from negative to positive coefficients when
market decentralisation increases is indicative of the presence of heterogeneity in
the relationship between these two variables22.
Figure 2: Rolling regression for exp and wbc
A similar pattern is observed in graph 3. The decentralisation measure is now
the sub-national revenue share as a proportion of total government revenue (rev).
The heterogeneity in the relationship between corruption and market decentrali-
sation is present regardless of the market decentralisation indicator that we use.
Graph 4 show the sensitivity of the coefficients of constitutional decentralisation
(unitaryhis), the degree of unitary history of a country. It is worth noting the
similarities between this graph and the previous ones. This variable does not mea-
sure the same aspects though since as we noted earlier unitary countries need not
be more fiscally centralised than federal countries (although in practice this seems
to be the case). In any case, this graph shows preliminary evidence suggesting
that the relationship between long unitary history and corruption may not be as
straightforward as it has been argued [Gerring et al. (2005)]. More importantly
it appears that the relationship between long unitary history and less corruption
22However we should note that number of sub-samples which yield a significant coefficient is
rather limited. It is likely that the drop in the number of observations in each sub-sample is
responsible (at least partly) for the drop in significance levels.
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is being driven by the sub-sample of historically unitarist countries which have a
higher GDP per capita than the rest of the countries. In fact, the average GDP
per capita for the sub-sample of historically unitarist countries is almost three
times that of the historically federal countries23.
Figure 3: Rolling regression for rev and wbc
From the previous analysis it is evident that aspects of market and constitutional
decentralisation are associated with corruption. It also appears that there may
be some heterogeneity in the relationship between these variables and corruption.
The results yielded by the rolling regression analysis suggest this may the case.
Furthermore, we would like to examine the form of heterogeneity existent in this
relationship and in order to do this we proceed with additional econometric anal-
ysis, this time adding interaction terms to the baseline specifications.
Now we want to examine the possibility that other aspects of decentralisation may
affect corruption indirectly or that market and constitutional decentralisation may
have an indirect rather than a direct effect on corruption. We use a base specifica-
tion including both controls for market and constitutional decentralisation and we
introduce some interactions terms. In principle, we would expect that other as-
pects of decentralisation or of the institutional environment may affect the impact
of market or constitutional decentralisation on corruption. The interactions that
we propose in this section are based in theoretical presumptions provided by the
relevant literature. For instance, we interact the market decentralisation control
23We split the sample into two grouping the countries above and below the average of unitary
history.
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Figure 4: Rolling regression for unitaryhis and wbc
(rev) with both GDP per capita and with the political decentralisation indica-
tors. It is expected that as nations become more developed the marginal effect of
market decentralisation on corruption will be smaller since the increase in GDP
per capita would improve corruption levels by a large extent. The interaction of
market decentralisation with political decentralisation indicators arises naturally
from Riker’s theory and it was previously tested by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya
(2007). Other interactions that may be of interest are the constitutional decen-
tralisation with ethnic and linguistic fragmentation: there is a long-standing line
of research arguing that federal countries are better suited than unitary system to
accommodate the effects of regional and ethnic differences [see Bermeo (2002) for
a recent evaluation of these ideas.].
Looking at the results presented in Table 9, one thing that we notice is that the
coefficients for both market (rev) and constitutional decentralisation (unitaryhis)
keep the expected sign and their significance in most cases. As a first result, we
can observe that the inclusion of interaction terms do not affect significantly the
direct effects of the two decentralisation aspects.
Regarding the results for the interaction terms, only three models, 1, 5 and 7 yield
significant coefficients. Model 1 produces a negative sign for interaction between
constitutional decentralisation and market decentralisation. The negative sign
implies that the positive effect of a unitary system on corruption is worsened when
the country becomes more fiscally decentralised. As discussed earlier, unitary
26
Ta
bl
e
7:
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
on
d
ec
en
tr
al
is
at
io
n
an
d
st
an
d
ar
d
co
nt
ro
ls
.
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
E
ff
ec
ts
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
r
ia
bl
e:
C
o
r
ru
pt
io
n
(W
B
C
in
d
ex
).
M
et
h
o
d
:
O
L
S
M
od
el
1
M
od
el
2
M
od
el
3
M
od
el
4
M
od
el
5
M
od
el
6
M
od
el
7
M
od
el
8
re
v
0.
03
7*
**
0.
06
4
0.
03
1
0.
02
8*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
04
0*
**
0.
03
8*
**
(6
.8
66
)
(1
.5
42
)
(0
.8
56
)
(5
.7
24
)
(7
.7
76
)
(7
.5
08
)
(5
.3
41
)
(6
.2
16
)
u
n
it
a
ry
h
is
0.
01
3*
**
0.
00
9*
**
0.
00
9*
**
0.
00
9*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
01
8
0.
00
8*
**
0.
03
2*
**
(4
.2
51
)
(5
.0
95
)
(4
.6
92
)
(4
.3
67
)
(3
.1
84
)
(0
.6
66
)
(3
.5
86
)
(3
.2
62
)
lo
g
g
d
p
1.
87
6*
**
2.
06
4*
**
1.
98
4*
**
1.
84
7*
**
1.
87
2*
**
1.
94
9*
**
2.
01
1*
**
1.
88
4*
**
(1
1.
29
2)
(7
.5
80
)
(1
0.
60
7)
(8
.6
98
)
(9
.4
59
)
(7
.3
39
)
(8
.0
05
)
(9
.8
48
)
lo
g
p
op
u
l
-0
.1
52
*
-0
.1
31
*
-0
.1
03
-0
.1
36
-0
.1
35
-0
.1
17
-0
.0
35
-0
.1
70
*
(-
1.
94
5)
(-
1.
76
8)
(-
1.
14
6)
(-
1.
42
4)
(-
1.
60
5)
(-
1.
45
2)
(-
0.
26
7)
(-
1.
98
1)
p
ss
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
03
(-
0.
61
3)
(-
0.
86
4)
(-
0.
53
0)
(-
1.
05
1)
(-
1.
00
5)
(-
0.
77
9)
(-
1.
20
8)
(-
0.
61
3)
I
N
T
:r
ev
·u
n
it
a
ry
-0
.0
00
**
-0
.0
00
*
(-
2.
11
3)
(-
1.
78
9)
I
N
T
:r
ev
·g
d
p
-0
.0
08
(-
0.
83
7)
m
u
n
i
-0
.1
07
0.
45
6*
0.
40
7
(-
0.
43
0)
(1
.7
32
)
(1
.4
99
)
I
N
T
:r
ev
·m
u
n
i
-0
.0
00
(-
0.
01
5)
I
N
T
:u
n
it
a
ry
·e
th
n
o
-0
.0
04
(-
0.
83
1)
I
N
T
:u
n
it
a
ry
·m
u
n
i
-0
.0
11
**
-0
.0
10
*
(-
2.
23
6)
(-
1.
85
7)
I
N
T
:u
n
it
a
ry
h
is
·g
d
p
-0
.0
02
(-
0.
33
1)
re
g
j
0.
00
7
**
(2
.3
72
)
I
N
T
:r
ev
·r
eg
j
-0
.0
01
**
(-
2.
58
2)
A
dj
R
2
0.
90
5
0.
90
0
0.
88
7
0.
90
3
0.
89
8
0.
89
9
0.
90
0
0.
90
1
N
53
53
47
45
47
53
30
47
N
ot
e:
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ex
cl
ud
e
A
rg
en
ti
na
an
d
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
ti
on
.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
(o
nl
y
t-
ra
ti
os
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
).
*
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l*
*
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l*
**
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
by
O
L
S.
Fo
r
de
ta
ils
on
da
ta
so
ur
ce
s
an
d
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n
se
e
ap
pe
nd
ix
??
.
27
systems need not be incompatible with other aspects of decentralisation. The sign
of this interaction is somewhat surprising. One possible reason for this to happen
is that when countries become more fiscally decentralized the effectiveness of a
unitary structure to control and monitor the growing amount of resources allocated
to the decentralised units decreases. In any event, even when the coefficient is
negative and significant, its size is very small.
Model 5 yields a negative sign for the interaction term between political and
constitutional decentralisation. Again, this means that the positive effect of con-
stitutional decentralisation on corruption worsens when the country becomes more
politically decentralised. Finally, the results for model 7 imply that the positive
effect of market decentralisation on corruption is worsened when the number of
intermediate jurisdictions grows. We have also tried other indicators of political
decentralisation interacted with market and constitutional decentralisation mea-
sures but none of these other interaction terms was found significantly different
from zero.
In model 8 we include both direct effects of fiscal and constitutional decentralisa-
tion and the interaction terms from models 1 and 5. The rationale for this is to
test whether these interactions still hold when included within the same econo-
metric model. Model 8 is clear in that it renders both direct effects and both
interaction terms significant. The signs are the same as those obtained in the
previous models. In this way, Model 8 stands both as a robustness check on the
model with direct effects and also as a more comprehensive model for describing
the empirical relationship between corruption and decentralisation. As it is clear
from this model, our suggestions earlier in this research have been upheld by the
analysis of the data.
5 Conclusions
The last 30 years have seen a large number of countries embark in some form
of decentralisation. While the causes of this trend are in general precise and
well-known, its consequences are much less certain and by no means definitive.
Evaluating the results of decentralisation is not an easy task. Case studies provide
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an important source of evidence but generalisation is not straightforward. Cross-
country and panel-data studies are becoming more common but suffer from two
main problems. On one hand, there are data issues. On the other hand, there
are modelling problems. These two elements act as limiting forces on both the
quantity and quality of empirical research. Nevertheless, there seems to be a
renewed scholarly commitment to take the empirics to new levels.
We need better and more thorough empirical studies. We argue that a first step
towards this is to understand decentralisation as multidimensional phenomenon
that has a large variety of effects. In this sense, we should ideally aim at identify-
ing these dimensions and postulating the likely effects and the interrelationships
between them. In this sense, the theoretical literature has provided with interest-
ing insights that have been often left unexplored by the empirical literature until
very recently. Our work in this paper has shown why this approach is important,
what are the some of questions still unresolved in the empirical literature and how
to attempt a sensible approach to tackling these issues.
Recent literature has acknowledged the presence of a number of aspects that make
the study of the relationship between decentralisation and corruption less obvious.
First, it has been recognized that different dimensions of decentralisation exist
and that they have complex interrelations. Second, it has been argued that the
extent and effects of decentralisation may depend on the existence and extent
of other dimensions of decentralisation. Although these ideas are not new, they
are becoming increasingly common in the empirical literature. Finally, it has
also been suggested that different dimensions of decentralisation may co-evolve
and their interactions over time might have a strong effect on corruption and the
institutional quality.
Our results in this paper may provide a few insights regarding the policy debate
on the effects of decentralisation. In particular, as we have seen, the positive effect
of market decentralisation on corruption seems to be larger when countries have
a deeply rooted unitarist history. While this result seems to be not so intuitive,
it is plausible that deepening fiscal decentralisation without changing the con-
stitutional basis or government organisation may indeed be associated to higher
corruption. After all, delegating more money to local governments which may
lack the autonomy to create taxes -as might the case in a strong unitary system-,
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may encourage bad governance and corruption. Furthermore, a growing num-
ber of unitary countries are resorting to local democratization processes via local
elections or referenda voting. Our results suggest that a move to higher political
decentralisation may have associated higher corruption particularly if the country
is has a unitarist tradition and low levels of market decentralisation. It should be
noted, that according to our results, the existence of long-standing unitary system
has both direct and indirect association with corruption. As these have opposite
signs, the overall result is uncertain and essentially an empirical matter.
Finally, although we have shown that our results are consistent with a sensible
specification, and robust to controlling for different variables and data, we are
rather shy regarding the direction of the causation. The aim in this paper has
been to analyse the effect that the several interrelationships between multiple
dimensions of decentralisation have on corruption. There may be additional con-
siderations if endogeneity of the regressors is a possibility. In conclusion, the issue
of whether decentralisation leads to more or less corruption is still uncertain and
much more empirical research is needed. But we believe that this future empir-
ical research should be aimed at exploring the interrelations of different aspects
or dimensions of decentralisation. The study of these aspects has been suggested
and carried out by Barenstein and de Mello (2001), Rodden (2002), Treisman
(2002b,a) and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007). Our study contributes to this
literature by both reinforcing some of the earlier findings and obtaining some new
evidence.
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Table 11: Variable description and data sources
Code Variable description Detail and source
cpi Corruption Perception Index Elaborated by Transparency International. This measure provides (subjective) perceptions of bureaucratic
corruption across countries. Scores range from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). From 1995 to 2004.
(Available from www.transparency.org)
wbc Control of Corruption Index One of the indicators of the Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset 2004 available from the
World Bank at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html#dataset.
icrg ICRG Corruption Ratings Corruption ratings included in the International Country Risk Guide Database elaborated by Political Risk
Services. Accessible at www.icrgonline.com.
logGDP Logarithm of GDP per capita The logarithm of real GDP per capita PPP was taken from the 2003 World Bank Indicators CD-Rom. From
1993 to 2001.
logPOPUL Logarithm of Total Population Years available 1969-2004. Data from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators (2006).
pss Press Freedom Index Index of Press Freedom. Ranges from 0 to 100 with low scores indicating more press freedom and high values
denoting less press freedom. Released by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).
exp Subnational expenditure as % of total government
expenditure
Average for the period 1990-2000 of the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. Available at http://www.
worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralisation/data.htm
rev Subnational revenue as % of total government rev-
enue
Average for the period 1990-2000 of the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. Available at http://www.
worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralisation/data.htm
muni Are municipal governments locally elected? Categorical variable taking the value of 2 if both the local executive and legislative are locally elected, 1
if the executive is appointed but the legislature elected and 0 if both are appointed. Available from the
Database of Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
state Are state/province governments elected? Categorical variable taking the value of 2 if both the state/provincial executive and legislative are elected,
1 if the executive is appointed but the legislature elected and 0 if both are appointed. Available from the
Database of Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
stconst Are the constituencies of the senators the
state/provinces?
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the Senate is elected on a state/province basis and 0 if otherwise. Taken
from the Database of Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
author Do the state provinces have authority over taxing,
spending or legislating?
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if any of these is true, 0 otherwise. Available from the Database of
Political Institutions 2004 (DPI).
Continued on next page
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Table 11: (continued)
11 – Continued from previous page
Code Variable description Detail and source
auton Are there autonomous regions? Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there exists autonomous contiguous regions, 0 otherwise. Available
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
pol Factor score for political decentralization It ranges from 0 (low decentralization) to 1 (high decentralization). Source: ?. Year of observations, 1996.
fis Factor score for fiscal decentralization It ranges from 0 (low decentralization) to 1 (high decentralization). Source: ?. Year of observations, 1996.
adm Factor score for administrative decentralization It ranges from 0 (low decentralization) to 1 (high decentralization). Source: ?. Year of observations, 1996.
dec2 Political decentralization index Constructed on the basis of aggregating auton, muni and state, from the Database of Political Institutions
(DPI).
dec4 Political decentralization index Constructed on the basis of aggregating muni and state, from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
federal Dummy for a federal country Variable taking the value of 1 if the country is federal, 0 otherwise. Based on the classification of Elazar (1995)
and the Handbook of Federal Countries. Other sources: CIA World Factbook, and selected Constitutions
of countries.
federal(2) Dummy for a federal country (broader concept) Variable taking the value of 1 if the country is federal, 0 otherwise. Based on the classification of Elazar (1995)
and the Handbook of Federal Countries. Other sources: CIA World Factbook, and selected Constitutions
of countries.
federal_alt Dummy for a federal country (Treisman) Dummy for federalism. Source: Treisman (2000).
fedindex Index of federalism Ranges from 1 to 5, with lower values indicating a more federal country. Source: STM103 Global Indicators
Shared Dataset V2.0 available at www.pippanorris.com.
unitary Index of unitarism Index taking the value of 0=federal (elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of subna-
tional authority) 1= semi-federal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level enjoying impor-
tant policy-making power but in which constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government)
2= unitary. Source: Gerring et al. (2005); ? available at www.pippanorris.com. Year=2000.
unitaryhis Index of Unitary History Cumulative index constructed on the basis of the annual values of unitary. Source: Gerring et al. (2005); ?
available at www.pippanorris.com. Year=2000.
tiers Number of elected sub-national tiers Data for year 1999. Source: www.worldbank.org.
regj Number of intermediate jurisdictions Data for year 1999. Source: www.worldbank.org.
locj Number of local jurisdictions Data for year 1999. Source: www.worldbank.org.
polrights Index of political rights Political Rights Index (Freedom House). From 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Source: www.freedomhouse.org.
Continued on next page
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Table 11: (continued)
11 – Continued from previous page
Code Variable description Detail and source
ethno Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index Average value of 5 different indexes of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999).
bri Dummy for former British colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a British colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), ? and CIA World Factbook.
fre Dummy for former French colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a French colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), ? and CIA World Factbook.
spa Dummy for former Spanish colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a Spanish colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), ? and CIA World Factbook.
por Dummy for former Portuguese colony Variable taking the value of 1 if the country has ever been a Portuguese colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman
(2000), ? and CIA World Factbook.
pro_d Dummy for Protestantism as dominant religion Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country’s dominant religion is Protestantism. Source: CIA World
Factbook.
eng English legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of English Common Law, 0 otherwise. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999)
soc Socialist legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of Socialist/Communist Laws, 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
fre French legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of French Commercial Code, 0 otherwise. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999)
ger German legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of German Commercial Code, 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
sca Scandinavian legal origin Dummy taking the value of 1 if the country has a tradition of Scandinavian Commercial Code, 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
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